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William A. McMaster*

Censorship and the Supreme
Court: Re Nova Scotia Board
of Censors et al. v. McNeil

1. Introduction
On January 8, 1974, the Nova Scotia Amusements Regulation
Board banned the showing of the film Last Tango in Paris. Gerard
McNeil, the editor of a Dartmouth newspaper, decided to challenge
the powers of the Board to make such prohibitions. He first
appealed to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, as required by
section 3(4) of the Theatres and Amusements Act' but he was not
recognized by that body as having the right to appeal. He then
requested the Attorney-General to refer the constitutionality of the
Act to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia,
but to no avail.
Early in 1974 Mr. McNeil applied to the Trial Division of the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court for a declaration that the Board was
exercising unconstitutional powers to censor or ban films. 2 In the
event that preliminary questions were resolved as to the proper
parties to the action, Hart J. granted standing to Mr. McNeil and
allowed the Court to set a date for hearing upon the constitutional
merits. Subsequently, an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada by
the Censor Board contesting the applicant's standing was dismissed
on May 20, 1975. 3
The issue of standing resolved, the Board appealed the decision
of Hart J. on the merits. 4 Argument was first heard by the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal in February, 1976. 5 That Court ruled that
the sections and Regulations under the Act which dealt with
censorship should be declared ultra vires. The ruling was appealed
*William A. McMaster, Osgoode Hall Law School. The author wishes to thank
Walter S. Tarnopolsky of Osgoode Hall Law School for his helpful suggestions and
encouragement.
1. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 304
2. Re McNeil et al. v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors et al. (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d)
259; (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 506
3. Nova Scotia Board of Censors et al. v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; (1975),
55 D.L.R. (3d) 632
4. Re McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 259;
(1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 483
5. McNeil v. Attorney-GeneralofNova Scotia (1976), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 227
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by the Attorney-General of Nova Scotia to the Supreme Court of
Canada 6 which held that, save for Regulation 32 of the Act, the
legislation giving power to ban or censor films is intra vires the
province. It is this latter judgment that will be the object of my
comments. The effect of the judgment is that the present practice of
film censorship (in the provinces which have relevant legislation)
will continue. In what follows, I will argue that the case was
wrongly decided by the Supreme Court, and I propose to outline the
positive consequences of a 'regulatory' scheme that recognizes this
fact.
I will in Part Two consider the arguments for provincial
competence, as discussed in the majority judgment and in the
dissent. In Part Three, the arguments relating to federal jurisdiction
will be reviewed, again, first by the majority and then by the
dissenting judges. Finally, in Part Four, a discussion will take place
as to the consequences that would have ensued had the Supreme
Court not ruled as it did.
II. ProvincialJurisdiction:
The Majority
a. Pith and Substance
Mr. Justice Ritchie, for the majority (Martland, Pigeon, Beetz and
de Grandpr6 JJ. concurring) first considered the validity of the Nova
Scotia Theatres and Amusements Act by characterizing it in pith
and substance as "regulation, supervision and control of the film
business within the province." ' 7 He continued: "the impugned
legislation constitutes nothing more than the exercise of provincial
authority over transactions taking place wholly within the
province." 8 The provisions empowering the Censor Board to ban
films were seen as "reinforcing the authority vested in a
provincially appointed Board to perform the task of regulation." 9
Ritchie J. viewed the censorship powers of the Board as incidental
to the regulation of the film business and not, as Chief Justice Bora
Laskin remarked in the dissent, prior control of public taste. In Mr.
Justice Ritchie's characterization the functions of the Board were
likened to those of controlling a specified set of business
6. Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors et al. and McNeil (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 1
7. Id.
8. Id.at 21
9. Id.

Censorship and the Supreme Court 739

transactions, viz., amongst film distributors and exhibitors; but
Laskin C.J. argued that the censorship aspect of this function
imported wider issues involving the public at large and interference
with the federal criminal law powers granted under section 91(27)
of the British North America Act. 10
Indeed, the view that the Board is involved in decisions affecting
only a specified set of film entrepreneurs is strange in light of the
Supreme Court's ruling on the matter of locus standi, which
required resolution before the present case could be heard on the
merits." The issue there was whether Mr. McNeil was a person
affected by legislation purporting to regulate only the film business
within the province; but standing was granted on the basis that the
legislation affected the public at large, thus allowing a member of
the public to claim locus standi. The Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously held that:
. . . there is an arguable case under the terms of the challenged
legislation that members of the Nova Scotia public are directly
affected in what they may view in a Nova Scotia theatre, albeit
there is a more direct effect on the business enterprises which are
regulated by the legislation. 12
Considering the statement that the public was "directly affected"
by the particular nature of the legislation at issue (i.e., that the
exhibition of films may be regulated by the Board), it is odd that the
majority of the Court in the instant case should choose to ignore the
wider, public ramifications of the legislation by holding that, in
effect, the Theatres and Amusements Act is merely regulatory of
certain business transactions. That is not to say at this stage that the
wider interpretation prima facie threatens the validity of the
legislation; but to neglect to incorporate that statement of fact made
in the standing case seems inconsistent.
At any rate, Ritchie J. appended two subordinate considerations
to the argument that it is the sole object of the legislation to regulate
business transactions. Taken together, they are that 'local standards'
can be applied to determine 'audience suitability' in the proper
discharge of the Board's function. Now, Regulation 32 issued under
the Theatres and Amusements Act prohibited any theatre owner
from permitting "an indecent or improper performance...",'a and
10. (1867), 30& 31 Vict. c.3 (U.K.); R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. 5

11. Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265
12. Id. at 271
13. Compare with s. 159(2) of the Criminal Code which provides, in part, that:
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this Regulation was declared by Ritchie J. to be null and void as
repugnant to section 159 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which
deals with obscenity.
The learned judge nowhere considered precisely the criteria used
by the Board in determining the decency or propriety of such shows;
for him the Board is merely applying 'local standards' of taste to
films compulsorily submitted for their approval. 14 In this respect,
'moral considerations', as Ritchie J. preferred to call them, are
acceptable in the execution of the requirements of the Act, as no
more significant, one presumes, than the 'moral standard' which
permits the province to take legislative action against companies
that pollute the environment. In both instances, actions require
regulation for the public good, the reasoning goes, and it is obvious
that to deny such intervention on the basis that it involves 'moral
standards' would be to strip the province of virtually all its
legislative power.
If, however, the true basis upon which the Censor Board makes
its determinations of suitability is examined, it must be concluded
that no consideration other than obscenity itself sets the standard.
Laskin C.J. in the dissent confirms that this is indeed the true
picture. He states that:
Cooper J.A. was of the opinion that it was clear from the material
before the Court that the film was placed in the rejected
classification because it was considered by the Board to offend
against acceptable standards of morality. The only material
before the Court consisted of various affidavits and of letters
exchanged between counsel for the parties. There were
affirmations in some of the affidavits of belief that the film was
banned because [it was] offensive to public morality and because
it was obscene. However, the Chairman of the [Censor] Board,
although swearing an affidavit, did not disclose in it any reason
for the ban and the Attorney General refused in an answering
letter to assign any reason for the ban when asked directly . . .
MacKiegan C.J.N.S. said flatly that "censorship of this type is
at obscenity and other immoral exhibitions".
obviously directed
15
(My emphasis)
In other words, it was a finding of the Supreme Court of Nova
(2) Everyone commits an offence who knowingly, without lawful justification
or excuse, .

.

. (b) publicly exhibits.

. .

an indecent show. .

..

14. Nova Scotia Theatres and Amusements Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 304, s. 15(t).
(Later we will turn to a closer examination of the criteria used by both the Board
and the Court in determining obscenity.)
15. (1978), 84D.L.R. (3d) 1 at8
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Scotia that more than mere 'moral considerations' were at work,
and that obscenity, which is properly the concern of the federal
authorities under relevant sections of the CriminalCode, was one of
the main criteria underlying the Board's decision to ban Last Tango
in Paris from theatres in Nova Scotia.
But, even if this inference is not founded upon fact, due to the
reluctance of the authorities to explicitly state what the criteria are,
it should be remembered that Regulation 32, which Ritchie J. later
struck down, is a pretty accurate indication of what the Board was
being asked to do, i.e., censor films on the basis of what in their
view is indecent. The effect of the learned judge's declaration was
to recognize that the legislature was overstepping its constitutional
authority in issuing Regulation 32, because it was in clear conflict
with provisions of the Criminal Code that deal with obscene or
indecent performances. And it is not a question of whether or not
the Board would have come to the same conclusion that a court of
law would have on a charge of obscenity: the fact that the Board is
doing something properly reserved to a prosecution under the
standards and procedures required by the Criminal Code is
sufficient to establish a conflict. Was it not, then, inconsistent to
leave intact the Board's power to apply those very considerations in
its daily operation? It would seem more consistent, on the facts,
either to have left the Regulation intact as a statement of the criteria
that the Board is to rely upon in their decisions or declare all the
sections dealing with censorship (not regulation) ultra vires the
provincial legislature.
b. 'Local and Private Matters'
What about the argument that, as tastes and standards vary across
Canada, "the determination of what is and is not acceptable for
public exhibition on moral grounds may be viewed as a matter of a
local and private nature in the province within the meaning of
section 92(16) of the B.N.A. Act?" 16 Does the head invoked by Mr.
Justice Ritchie suffice constitutionally to allow the preference for
local standards of taste to dictate the scope of provincial censorship
powers? In answering in the affirmative, the learned judge cited the
Local Option case in which Lord Watson stated that if a subject is
not specifically enumerated in section 91 or 92 of the B.N.A. Act
16. Id. at 28
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then if it is 'local and private' in nature it is reserved to the
17
provinces' jurisdiction.
To make such a determination it is not enough to say that 'local
standards' suffice alone to bring the whole practice of the Censor
Board under the jurisdiction of the province: the 'pith and
substance' of the legislation as well as the practices of the Board
must first be viewed. Actually, 'local standards' of acceptability
applied by the Board is not the type of 'local and private matter'
contemplated by section 92(16). It is an administrative or policy
standard which, as found by the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, has
as its true object the determination of what is indecent or obscene.
Put another way, the alleged power to be sensitive to local tastes
cannot be allowed to obscure what the Board is actually doing, and
it is a mistake to say that the 'local matters' head of section 92
admits 'local standards' of administrative functioning. If that were
the case any provincial legislation could be validated on the basis
that the 'standards' considered before administrative action is taken
are different from those that apply anywhere else, making it thus a
'local and private matter'. The true meaning of section 92(16) is as
Lord Watson characterized it in Local Option, supra, cited by
Ritchie J. himself: it is a residual head analogous to "peace, order
and good government". It is properly invoked when a matter in
dispute cannot be said to fit into any of the other heads of sections
91 and 92 of the B.N.A. Act. It was placed there to catch
eventualities that the framers of the B.N.A. Act could not have
foreseen, and that would not fit within the four corners of any of the
other heads of jurisdiction. 18 To invoke it as it has been in the
instant case can only be done after the other possibilities of
characterization have been exhausted, and to rely solely upon the
Board's 'local' objects in effect skips over this exercise. Its use by
the learned judge is even stranger in light of the fact that he has
17. A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. for the Dominion, [1896] A.C. 348 at 359. "(Section
92(16)) assigns to the provincial legislature all matters in a provincial sense local or
private which have been omittedfrom the preceding enumeration." (My emphasis)
18. Prof. Hogg in his Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1977)

says of this head that -"inpractice it has turned out to be quite unimportant because
its work has been done for it by section 92(13): Property and Civil Rights in the
Province" (p. 242). This intepretation means that the terms "local and private" in
their raw form are not particularly edifying when coming to a determination of
whether a matter is federally or provincially valid; what must happen is that the
matter must find an affinity with one of the other heads of section 92 before it can
be so determined. See Hogg, chapter 7
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already characterized the legislation as "in relation to property":
that has the effect of rendering his statements on this aspect obiter.
Before leaving this subject, however, the merits, if any, of the
'local standards' argument should be examined not for their
constitutional substance but in order to see if a practical purpose
would be served by allowing provincial authorities to regulate what
we may or may not see.
The issue of which jurisdiction is the proper one to regulate
various forms of publishing and broadcasting is briefly discussed by
Professor Hogg in his book on the Constitution. 19 He states that
. . . the regulation of speech which is not typically criminal in
form (for example because it makes use of an administrative
agency) and which is specifically limited to issues of primarily
local significance, (for example, the depiction of commercial
advertising, violence and sex) should follow the constitutional
boundaries of the media. This means that the federal Parliament
may impose regulation on radio and most forms of television, and
the provincial legislatures may impose content regulation on
films, live theatre, literature and records. 20 (Footnotes omitted)
What Professor Hogg seems to be saying is, inter alia, that he
upholds the present practices of the provincial censor boards on the
basis that they are the best solution to the administrative problem of
controlling locally what the public consume. He implicitly
recognizes the desirability of local standards being preserved and
respected, and yet I believe that the mistake he makes is in lumping
all forms of 'content regulation' into one category, that is, he says,
if it is part of an administrative scheme it is unconditionally
acceptable. Some forms of 'content regulation' are constitutionally
valid for the provinces, viz., liquor advertising 2 l and advertising
directed towards children. 22 And some are validly federal; for
example, the power of the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission to regulate Canadian versus
foreign content. But the issue of their moral objectionability
19. Hogg, id.
20. Id. at 428. "The depiction of . . . violence and sex" is covered by section
159(8) of the Criminal Code:

. . . the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of the
following subjects, namely crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed
to be obscene.
21. Regina v. Telegram Publishing Co. Ltd. (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 471 (Ont.

H.C.)
22. Attorney-General of Quebec v. Kellogg's Co. of Canada (1978), 83 D.L.R.
(3d) 314 (S.C.C.)
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transcends local administrative considerations, and must be viewed
in relation to the powers of each jurisdiction according to the
constitution. So the 'local matters' argument does not help us to
decide whether the type of regulation is one that can be done by one
jurisdiction or the other. In the above examples it has been held that
the content regulation must fall within some valid federal or
provincial purpose.
In sum, the 'constitutional boundaries of the media' cannot be
allowed to determine the powers of each jurisdiction; the
constitutional boundaries of each jurisdiction must determine the
powers exercised in relation to the media. What must be examined
in all cases are the aspects purporting to bring the activity within
each jurisdiction; it must not be assumed that methods of
transmission or places of consumption dictate a priori all matters
affecting that activity.
The Dissent
The Chief Justice, in his dissent, 2 3 expressed other grounds for
disputing the province's competence to empower a censor board to
ban films. The argument consists of three aspects: a.
Penalty/Prohibition b. Provincial Powers and c. Paramountcy.
a. Penalty/Prohibition
Laskin C.J. began by dismissing the contention that since there is no
penalty attached when the Censor bans a film, it cannot be thought
of as in relation to criminal law. Ritchie J. in his argument that the
Board is clothed with powers to ban films points out that this
measure is preventive. He stated that:
[The Theatres and Amusements Act] is directed to regulating a
trade or business where [the Criminal Code] is concerned with
of crime; ...one is preventative
the definition and punishment
24

while the other is penal.

In the dissent, this view is seen as improperly empowering the
Board to "do by prior restraint what it cannot do by defining an
offence and prescribing post facto punishment.''25 I find the
reasoning of the Chief Justice a little difficult to follow: he cannot
be understood as taking away in toto the provincial power to
23. Concurred in by Judson, Spence and Dickson. JJ.
24. (1978), 84D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 16
25. Id. at 28
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prescribe penalties post facto for prohibited acts, as section 92(15)
of the B.N.A. Act gives the provinces the ability to prescribe
"punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment", in relation to
provincialmatters. Although Laskin C.J. did not expressly mention
it, it is the crime that is not open to legislation for prevention under
section 92(15) and that is because the prohibited act falls within the
federal criminal jurisdiction. The mere declaration that the province
is creating a prohibited act (i.e., showing a banned film) is not
enough. It must be shown that the prohibited act is criminal in
nature. And this he proceeded to do, 26 first by describing the
provincial powers that are properly exercised, and then by turning to
a consideration of the federal criminal law.
b. ProvincialPowers
What, then, are some of the indicia of provincial competence? The
first proviso that Laskin C.J. stipulated for such legislation to be
valid is that "the legislative objects must in themselves be anchored
in the provincial catalogue of powers," '2 7 and he found no such
anchorage in the Board's power to censor films. The words of the
Chief Justice himself should suffice to explain:
What is asserted . . . by way of tying the challenged provisions
to valid provincial regulatory control, is that the province is
competent to licence the use of premises, and may. . . determine
what shall be exhibited. This would . . . justify control by the
province of any conduct and activity in licensed premises, even if
not related to the property aspect of licensing, and is patently
indefensible28
Censorship, he concluded, takes place without relation to any
premises. Bdard v. Dawson, 29 the case where 'disorderly houses'
26. To support this proposition, i.e., that the provinces cannot legislate in federal
matters even by prior prohibition, 'escaping' the penalty problem, Laskin C.J. cites
A.-G. Ont. v. Koynok et al., [1941] 1 D.L.R. 548 (Ont. S.C.) where legislation
purporting to give the A.-G. power to seek injunction or prohibition to distrain
publishing of obscene material was declared ultra vires. The legislation differed
slightly from the impugned Nova Scotia Theatres and Amusements Act in the
instant case: nowhere here does the Board have the statutory power to seek

injunction. Thus, Laskin C.J. equates a banning with an injunction, as both have
the effect of preventing public access to material. The issue as to whether both
make their determination on the basis of obscenity is in dispute, depending on how
the Board's "standards" are characterized. See note 38, infra
27. McNeil, supra, note 6 at 16

28. Id.
29. [1923] S.C.R. 681
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could be closed by provincial authority (only if persons habituating
them had been convicted of a criminal offence), heavily relied upon
by the appellant, was distinguished as it was "in relation to
property": specifically, the occupation and enjoyment of premises.
But that legislation was held valid, as distinguishable from the
legislation invalidated in Switzman v. Elbling.3 0 In the latter case,
all that was said of Bdard v. Dawson by Kerwin C.J. was that "the
Bidard case was concerned with control and enjoyment of
property."
Switzman, supra, which was concerned with the prohibition of
Communist propaganda, was held to be in relation to the criminal
law: the provincial claim that it was framed in relation to property
was rejected. For the purposes of the property argument, then, it
would not be unreasonable to expect that neither the dissemination
of 'propaganda' nor the exhibition of 'indecent' films can be
controlled through curbs on the use of the premises in which they
might happen to occur. (Do not forget that films in Nova Scotia to
which the public is to be admitted, regardless of the premises they
are shown in, must be submitted for approval to the censors before
they are exhibited in specific theatres in the province. In my view,
this tends to weaken the contention that that form of regulation is in
relation to any specific premises, or the regulation of business
activity, and strengthens the position that censorship happens in
respect of films qua their moral objectionability: see section 3(2) (a)
of the Theatres and Amusements Act.) Bdard v. Dawson, supra,
which seems to have been the only authority upon which the
appellants could rely, concerned measures specifically aimed at the
control of the use to which premises are put. In film exhibition the
use of the premises is to view a film. If there are any ulterior
purposes to which those premises are being put that the legislators
want to control, they must state openly their intention in separate
legislation, even if it be along the lines of prohibiting a certain class
of persons from gathering at one place. This was held valid in
Bdard, and I see no reason why it could not be equally enforceable
in respect to a theatre. But an Act of such general application as the
Theatres and Amusements Act (which has universal application to
all places where films are shown, and which has the total public as
its target) must surely fall outside the more strict ambit of B&dard.
A line of authority follows in Chief Justice Laskin's reasons
30. [1957] S.C.R. 285; 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337
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which focus upon provincial legislation that has been held valid as
being in relation to property. For example, control of liquor
advertising has been held to be in relation to the sale of liquor in the
province, 3 1 and likewise control of disorderliness in licensed
premises. 32 Both involved enactments falling under the scheme of
control of liquor, a settled provincial concern. Similarly, post facto
curbs upon gambling are distinguished as being directed against the
licensee; presumably escaping the Criminal Code provisions against
gamblers. 33 Laskin C. J. took judicial notice of a strong dissent in
that case by Adamson J.A. who stated that as a result of that law a
hotel-owner could be held liable to conviction for gambling in any
room of the hotel. 3 4 Finally, Henry Birks and Sons (Montreal)Ltd.
v. Montreal3 5 was followed. In that case, provincial controls of
observance of religious holidays were struck down as having a
tenuous connection with property. 3 6 The instant case seems to
militate against the history of judicial interpretation of the
prescribed federal and provincial powers, that is, that a recogizable
anchor in property rights must exist. Laskin C.J. gave us this
summarization of the case law having to do with activities that can
be sanctioned by the provinces: where there is the possibility of
overlap into federal areas there must be a strong, clear anchor in one
of the provincially enumerated powers. The Chief Justice took issue
with Mr. Justice Ritchie's opinion that the legislation in dispute was
simply in relation to property. He recognized the possibility of such
an overlap, and, indeed, he determined that the extent of overlap
was fatal to the legislation. Thus, the second proviso that Laskin
C.J. had to address was the paramountcy issue.
c. Paramountcy
The Chief Justice was inclined to hold that the operating federal
field of the criminal law serves to render inoperative the censorship
provisions of the Theatres and Amusements Act. To do so, the
extent to which the legislation resembles the criminal law must be
examined. To provide the full context of this issue, we must turn to
the arguments contained in both the majority and the dissent in
relation to this head.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Regina v. Telegram Publishing Co. (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 471 (Ont. H.C.)
Regina v. Skagstead and Skagstead, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 295 (Man. C.A.)
Miller v. The Queen, [1954] 1 D.L.R. 148 (Man. C.A.)
Id. at 156
[1955]S.C.R. 799
Id. at 24
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III. FederalJurisdiction:
The Majority
After dealing with the property aspects of the Theatres and
Amusements Act, Ritchie J. turned to a discussion of the purported
criminal dimensions of it. He took notice of the reasons for rejection
of the legislation by Mr. Justice Cooper of the Supreme Court of
Nova Scotia which were, he said, that the Board's criteria for
rejecting films were based upon considerations of public morals,
which is properly the jurisdiction of the federal Parliament under
section 91(27) of the B.N.A. Act. In addition, the reasons of Mr.
Justice McKiegan of the court below were recognized. As we have
seen, his comments were more direct: for him, censorship of this
type "is obviously directed at obscenity . . . an invalid invasion of
the federal criminal field." 3 7 Finally Mr. Justice Ritchie acknowledged the 'fundamental freedoms' grounds elicited by Judges
MacDonald and Cooper, but he put off discussion of that matter
until later.
a. 'Crime'
The first argument used in rejection of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court's position was that no 'punishment' was created; it was
merely a regulatory scheme. Ritchie J. went no further with the
argument than this; so it amounts to a flat statement implying that if
no post facto punishment exists on a literal reading of the Act, then
the province is free to legislate on any matter. With respect, this
cannot be the law. As we have seen, the Chief Justice descends with
some vehemence upon this argument and, to summarize his opinion
here, the presence or lack of a 'punishment' is not crucial to a
determination of the subject matter and hence the constitutionality
of the impugned legislation; it is not valid to attempt by prior
38
restraint what one cannot do by subsequent punishment.
b. Morality/Criminality
Mr. Justice Ritchie seemed to be content to validate the legislation
37. McNeil v.A.-G. N.S. (1976), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 227 at 228
38. In fact, however, the legislature did prescribe punishment for breach of the
Act, or its Regulations: such consequences may include arrest without warrant
(s.9), suspension of exhibitor's or distributor's licenses (s.2(3)), fines of from
twenty to two hundred dollars (s.8) and, if violation of the Act results in bodily
injury, the 'person violating' the Act may be imprisoned for up to one year (s. 10).

Censorship and the Supreme Court 749

negatively, i.e., by finding fault with the judgment below. There is
no objection to this form of reasoning, except that it depends upon
an accurate reading of what the court below held, rather than an
exclusive examination of the merits of the case before the Supreme
Court. In so doing, Ritchie J. made a fundamental mistake in his
characterization of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia's basis for
rejecting the Act as 'equating morality with criminality'. The short
answer is that the court below made a finding that the Board was
39
determining what was obscene.
Ritchie J. used this characterization to attack the court below by
quoting Lord Atkin in ProprietaryArticles Trade Association v.
Attorney-General for Canada to the effect that "morality and
criminality are far from co-extensive."40 It is an odd choice of a
quotation, for in its own context it was used to validate the federal
power to create new crimes, even if they have no 'moral'
objectionability. If we accept this view, i.e., that criminality is not
dependent upon morality, all it means is that the federal Parliament
can define crimes as it sees fit. Mr. Justice Ritchie used the
quotation here to say that if it is an act prohibited on moral grounds,
it need not be criminal; not necessarily 'an invasion of the federal
criminal field'. Thus, the two arguments regarding which authority
is competent to act are set off: one saying that 'morality' does not
necessarily bring the issue within the federal realm; the other, as we
have seen, saying that a tenuous connection with property does not
suffice to reserve it to the provinces. It is clear that what is needed to
resolve the impasse is a more perceptive understanding of what this
legislation is purporting to do.
Nevertheless, Ritchie J. proceeded to consider the 'morality'
question as prima facie not fatal to provincial jurisdiction. In so
doing, he mis-characterized what the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia
found as a fact, viz., that the Board was engaged in a determination
of what is obscene. The learned judge here never came forth and
found to the contrary in so many words; he merely characterized it
as a 'local standard of morality' coming into play. With the 'local
standard' element I have no argument (at least, for the present), but
as we have seen that does not suffice ipso facto to take the entire
matter out of federal competence. Ritchie J. did not explicitly state
as much, and so one can only infer that he thought that the Board
39. See quote, supra, p. 739
40. [1931]A.C. 310at 324(P.C.)
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was not finding or applying standards of obscenity. 4 1
In any case, the issue may not hinge upon the similarity, or lack
thereof, between the Board's criteria and those invoked with the
guidance of section 159(8) of the Criminal Code. What I think the
court below established was that the Board was usurping a function
expressly reserved to the federal criminal law, namely, prosecuting
exhibitions that allegedly are obscene, whatever that word entails.
The argument that Ritchie J. used to defend the Board's powers, in
my respectful opinion, overlooked this fact. The 'moral' elements
appealed to, although in theory perhaps not meeting the more
objective terms of section 159(8) of the Code, are still remarkably
similar in that they have the same purpose: the elimination of that
which offends the moral (not aesthetic) sensibilities of the 'average'
moviegoer. If anything, the ill-defined standards of the Board
should be struck down as allowing a far more arbitrary
interpretation of what those sensibilities are, than do the provisions
of the Criminal Code section, which must have as a dominant
characteristic "the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one
or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty
and violence."
If, however, we grant the objection that the standards used by the
Board are different from those set out in the Code, enabling them to
operate concurrently, it must be established that the standards and
objectives are indeed so different as to provide a significant
distinction. In Regina v. Odeon Morton Theatres, Ltd. and United
Artists42 the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that the film Last
Tango in Paris(the same film that was banned by the Nova Scotia
Censor, which brought about this appeal) had to be judged by
43
"contemporary community standards."
In that case, Freedman C.J.M of the Manitoba Court of Appeal
held that the 'community standards' test had many factors,
including testimony of experts, the fact that the film was restricted
to persons eighteen years of age and over, and the fact that the film
was being shown in four provinces without cuts. (This case was
heard prior to the banning by the Nova Scotia Censors.) The learned
41. The Board was certainly reticent on the issue of how it made its determinations
and, no evidence to the contrary, I cannot see how the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia made an error in holding as it did. In any case Mr. Justice Ritchie never
formally contradicts this factual determination.
42. (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 185; 45 D.L.R. (3d) 224 (Man. C.A.)
43. Id. at 196. [The film was found to be not obscene].
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judge said, after reviewing the evidence: "I am loath to believe that
Manitobans are less tolerant, less sophisticated or more in need of
protective shelter than other Canadians.""4
Taken as a whole, in my estimation, this judgment illustrates the
similarity in objectives of the censors and the obscenity provisions
of the Criminal Code. The court took judicial notice of the status of
the film before the various Boards in the country, and concluded
that, although not binding in any way upon the Court, the notion of
"community standards' may well be one shared by the two
jurisdictions. The Court dismissed any idea that Manitobans were in
need of special 'protection', over and above that afforded by
existing local authorities. Of course, should those authorities be
found to be exercizing censorship powers unconstitutionally the
process of Criminal prosecution would have to step into the breach
where necessary. Recent jurisprudence on motion picture obscenity
demonstrates that the courts are up to the task.
The reasons of Freedman C.J.M. are a good example. First there
was the suggestion that the status of a given film before other
Boards can be used to determine whether that film is obscene. It is a
novel approach, because from it one infers that the Court sees its
function as 'protecting' the public from unwanted depictions of
unpalatable things. This objective is reminiscent of the purpose for
which the Censor Boards themselves were created, but further, it
underlines the possibility of some kind of accord between the two
levels if, as I will suggest later in this article, the provincial boards
are stripped (or, relinquish) their powers to ban or cut films
(retaining the power of classification). That approach is based on
the reason given by the Chief Justice of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal, which was that since the film was classified 'restricted', a
vulnerable sector of the population, viz., those under eighteen,
would be effectively protected from seeing the film. Hence, there is
less of a compunction to totally remove the film from the public
through a finding of obscenity. The effect may be a tightening of the
circumstances under which a finding of this sort will be made; thus,
if the local Board has classified a film accordingly, and the Court is
less likely to make a finding, all things being equal, the exhibitor is
being 'protected' from prosecution, which heretofore has been one
of his chief complaints about the system. But more on this later.
The final objection I have is that, as mentioned earlier, Mr.
Justice Ritchie 'severed' Regulation 32, which stated explicitly that
44. Id. 16 C.C.C. (2d) at 196; 45 D.L.R. (3d) at 236
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the Board may "define what constitutes an indecent or improper
performance" as being repugnant to section 159(2) of the Criminal
Code. My objection is that there is no difference between what the
Regulation said the Board should do and what the Board actually
does, i.e., determine what is obscene. It does not even have to be
'obscene', for neither the Regulation nor this section of the Code
use the word "obscenity". The distinction is, in my estimation,
barely evident, and should not continue to be allowed to form the
basis of the Board's powers.
c. Preventionof Crime
Mr. Justice Ritchie went on to state that even if the impugned
legislation is concerned with 'criminal morality', "it would still
have to be noted that it is preventive rather than penal." ' 4 5 In this
context, Ritchie J. was speaking in terms of prevention of crime and
was attempting to bring it under Bdard v. Dawson, supra. With
respect, I cannot see the validity of this line of reasoning. Nowhere
did the learned judge state what kind of crime. Did he mean
disorderly conduct? Sexual offences? What evidence did the Court
rely upon to support the proposition that movies incite or otherwise
advocate the commission of crimes? The legislation upheld in
Bidard was created to prevent convicted criminals from gathering
in private premises and conspiring to commit further crimes. Those
circumstances surely do not bear comparison to the typical ones
surrounding private citizens who attend a cinema; public premises
that are licensed by the provincial authorities. If the province can
determine what the public may see on this contentious basis, it will
next be able to do so unchallenged in live theatre, concerts and
possibly even broadcasting. The possibilities for abuse take on
frightening proportions.
d. Double Aspect
Next the learned judge insisted that the Act and the Code provisions
can co-exist. He stated that the Board can affix standards of
morality notwithstanding that the Criminal Code penalizes obscene
or indecent performances. 46 To this end, he cited O'Grady v.
Sparling,47 in which provincial driving offences were upheld even
45. McNeil, supra, note 6 at 23
46. Criminal Code, s. 163(1)
47. [1960]S.C.R. 804
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though the federal Parliament had enacted legislation covering
driving offences. 4 8 Ritchie J. made no direct factual comparisons
here, but it must be inferred that the sole ground for his reliance
upon this authority was that there is not "a complete identity of
subject matter" 49 between the conflicting provisions, which, as we
have already seen, is open to some doubt. Instead, the learned judge
went on to consider the case of Smith v. The Queen 50 where section
63 of the SecuritiesAct 5 ' was held not to be repugnant to Criminal
Code provisions. It was held to be intra vires the province, as, in the
words of the then Chief Justice Kerwin of the Supreme Court of
Canada, "[i]t is merely incidental to the main purpose and aim of
the enactment"

. . . (in the words of Lord Atkin for the Judicial

Committee in Lymburn v. Mayland [1932] A.C. 318 at 324) "that
persons who carry on the business of dealing in securities shall be

honest and of good repute ....
",52 It will be noted that the
legislation had business ethics of dealers as its object: no one would
likely argue with similar legislation in relation to theatre managers
or distributors, but to extend that principle to permit censorship is to
me somewhat difficult to follow.
Finally, pursuing the argument that 'moral' considerations can be
the object of valid provincial legislation, Mr. Justice Ritchie relied
upon Quong Wing v. The King, 5 3 a rarely cited case that would be
an embarrassment today were it to come before the Supreme Court,
and almost certainly would be decided differently. In that case, the
provincial legislation prohibited the employment of white women
by Chinamen on pain of a $100 penalty. It was held valid as in
relation to a place of business "in the interests of the morals of
women and girls of Saskatchewan. ' 54 In effect, the civil rights of
Chinamen were held to be secondary to the protection of the morals
of the women of the province. 5 5 Apparently, the importation of a
'morality' aspect was deemed, sixty-five years ago, to supersede
48. Criminal Code, s. 233
49. Per Judson J., O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804 at 807. Laskin C.J.
deals with this problem - see infra
50. [1960] S.C.R. 776
51. R.S.O. 1950, c. 351, s. 63. The section dealt with furnishing false information
in a prospectus.
52. Smith v. The Queen, supra, note 50 at 780 (my emphasis)
53. (1914), 49S.C.R. 440; 18D.L.R. 121; 23 C.C.C. 113

54. Per Sir Charles Fitzpatrick C.J. S.C.R. at 444; D.L.R. at 124; C.C.C. at 116
55. Id. The substantial reason that the Court relied upon to uphold the legislation
was that it had the 'morals of women in the province' as its true object, not
discrimination against Chinamen.
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understanding between races. In another sense, however, this case
is bad authority for the reason that the Censor is not 'protecting the
morals' of persons by banning films. It is withholding from public
view that which is indecent or offensive; that which does not
56
correspond to 'community standards' of morality.
FederalJurisdiction:
The Dissent
In his reasons, the Chief Justice considered the extent to which the
federal criminal law overrides the powers of the Board in banning
films. His first authority was Regina v. Board of Cinema Censors,
ex parte Montreal Newsdealers Supply Co. 57, in which Batshaw J.
of the Quebec Superior Court declared the Quebec Publicationsand
Public Morals Act 58 (in which a Board of Censors was given the
power to determine whether any illustration in any periodical was
'immoral') to be ultra vires. This case distinguished, inter alia,
O'Grady v. Sparling, and Mann v. The Queen, as not dealing with
public morals, the latter being an aspect of the federal criminal law
power. The Chief Justice went on to reiterate that "the
determination of what is indecent or obscene in conduct or in
publication . . . whether in films, in art or in a live performance is,
as such, within the exclusive power of the Parliament . .. in

59
relation to the criminal law."
A line of cases followed in the dissent which substantiates the
breadth of the criminal powers, starting with A.-G. of Ont. v.
Hamilton Street Railway60 as authority for the proposition that the
criminal law power has been held to be -as much a brake on
provincial legislation as a source of federal legislation. 6 1 More
directly pertinent is Switzman v. Elbling, supra, which states that
suppression of propagandist literature cannot be framed in terms of
property, or other provincial heads. As Fauteux J. said in the course
of his reasons:

56. By contrast, it could be said that classifying films (i.e., as Restricted, Adult, or
General) accomplishes a 'protective' purpose. That is, it protects those films with
'adult' content from youth. Can it be seriously maintained in this day and age that
the public require the same kind of protection, based upon the premise that what an
adult views determines his behaviour towards others?
57. (1967), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 512 (Que. Sup. Ct.)
58. R.S.Q. 1964, c. 50
59. McNeil, supra, note 6 at 14

60. [1903] A.C. 524 (P.C.)
61. McNeil, supra, note 6at 14
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In such cases, the rights being encroached upon are not those of
an individual entitling him to a monetary compensation.6 2 The
rights

. . .

are those of society itself involving punishment.

Finally, the fact that films themselves have been subject to
prosecution under the CriminalCode is noted. As we saw earlier, it
is difficult to separate the motives behind provincial assessment of a
film's suitability from those of a court in a criminal proceeding:
both purport to use 'local' or 'community' standards. As well, there
has been some jurisprudence of late to suggest that the court may be
guided by what the provincial Boards are doing, presumably on the
premise that the same criteria are operating. In view of these
similarities, Laskin C.J. comes to the conclusion that the doctrine of
paramountcy must take effect, i.e., that the censorship power of the
Nova Scotia Theatres and Amusements Act is inoperative, being an
infringement upon section 159 of the Criminal Code.
IV. A ProposedAlternatvie
The pros and cons of state intervention in the moral conduct of the
public have been expressed by numerous authors and critics, from
John Stuart Mill to H.L.A. Hart. 63 The debate has ranged far and
wide, and will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that it pitted
the individual's fundamental right to freedom of thought and
expression against the fear that without the control of ideas harmful
to peace, dignity and civility, the state would lose its cohesiveness.
What we are dealing with here, however, is the reality that, as an
expression of the general will of the public, some form of sanction
must obtain against those who would subvert or debase morality, or
profit by such acts. What I think does bear examination are the
mechanisms through which this will is expressed.
The McNeil case has shown that, constitutionally, there can be
entertained some objection to the provinces' maintaining themselves as the arbiters of social moral behaviour. The existence of a
range of federal provisions setting out and punishing anti-social
activity seems to close this area off from the provinces. The object
at this point, given the uncertainty of the entire exercise of
adjudicating these matters (save for the fact that the Supreme Court
has guaranteed, for all practical purposes, the jurisdiction of the
62. Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 320 (translation)
63. For a succinct summary of these and other views, see J. Weiler, Controlling
Obscenity by CriminalSanction (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 415
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provinces over this matter), should be to specify once and for all
who we want to make these determinations. Only then can we effect
the improvements in the system that we desire, notwithstanding the
decision in McNeil.
This will not, as I have said, lead us into a debate upon the merits
of censorship versus fundamental freedoms. 64 Those arguments are
beyond the scope of this article. But, involved in the sensitive
question of how these standards are to be arrived at and enforced are
considerations of how the interests of Canadian society are to be
best served.
At present, the Criminal Code directs itself to obscenity through
section 159 and related sections. Various tests as to what constitutes
obscenity have been developed and revised through the years.
Joseph Weiler, in his article, 6 5 summarizes them, and perhaps that
article should be referred to for further detail as to their
development. Of course, the standards orginally were subjective, as
in R. v. Hicklin66 where a publication was considered obscene if
"(it is) to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral purposes." 67 One objection to this test is, as Weiler points
out, that it requires a subjective, speculative evaluation by the judge
as to the corrupting and depraving tendencies of the material upon a
group of unknown readers. The possibilities for inconsistency were
obvious, so Parliament in 1959 enacted section 159(8) of the
criminal Code to try and provide a more objective standard in
addition to the Hicklin test. The section forbids in part "the undue
exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following
subjects, nmely, crime, horror, cruelty. and violence." This
standard has had judicial interpretation, 68 but the problem has been,
64. The issue of 'fundamental freedoms' was dealt with very summarily by Ritchie
J. for the majority, who dismissed the argument that the Board could "affect some
of the rights" by saying that "it was not the purpose of the Act" and to hold
otherwise would "involve speculation as to the intention of the legislature"
(McNeil, supra, note 6 at 29). With respect, I do not think that the learned judge
appreciated the issues involved. On the other hand, Chief Justice Laskin, in the
dissent, spoke not a word regarding this dimension, as he was content to hold
invalidate the legislation on the narrower grounds given. But one can infer that he
premised his remarks on the assumption that the powers exercised by the Board
could be used to infringe such rights as exist.
65. Supra, note 63
66. (1868), 3 Q.B.D. 360
67. Id. at 371. See Weiler, supra, note 63 at 418
68. See, for example, the dicta of Mr. Justice Judson in R. v. Brodie, [1962]
S.C.R. 681
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and is, the application of the 'standard' to particular fact situations;
that is, determining when something falls within the 'standard'. One
important test of interest here is the so-called 'community
standards' test introduced by Mr. Justice Judson in R. v. Brodie in
1962.69 It had its origin in an Australian case, R. v. Close 70 where it
was propounded that there exists in every community a sense of
decency; and that a jury is competent to discover and apply these
71
standards.
It is submitted that this standard, although vague, is nevertheless
closely analogous to that invoked by the provincial Censor Boards.
The test seems to admit local community standards, that is, the
judge is permitted to consider the immediate social context out of
which a charge has arisen. Also admissible, as we have seen, is
72
evidence of the film's acceptability in other regions of the country
73
as well as expert testimony as to the merits of the film in question.
Now, it is obvious that the sum total of these tests, if they are
admitted, and the evidence which is considered, will not
conclusively determine the acceptability of a given film, for in
many cases (especially in the case of a film such as Last Tango in
Paris, which has been subjected to the highest praise and the
deepest criticism) reasonable men will differ on this point. But, that
is not to say that, a fortiori, the factors taken into consideration by
the Court are not as 'sensitive' to local needs as those of a provincial
tribunal. 74 Indeed, it is my submission that the Court has the
potential for a far more enlightened assessment of the merits than
that which summarily occurs in a screening room attended by three
or four politically answerable appointees.
It should be apparent by now that I am advocating the voluntary
removal of censorship powers (i.e., banning or cutting films) from
the provincial authorities, but leaving intact their powers of
classification, as the latter serves to exclude a class of persons from
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
[1948] V.L.R. 445 (Vict. S.C.)
Cf. Weiler, supra, note 63 at 420 (my emphasis)
See, for example, the tests applied by Freedman C.J.M. of the Manitoba Court

of Appeal in Regina v. Odeon Morton Theatres (1974), 16 C.C.C. (2d) 185

73. Id.
74. Especially as, in the case of one provincial tribunal (the Ontario Censor
Board), cuts are made that result in the exact same version of a film being shown in
Stratford as on Yonge Street, Toronto. Can it truly be said that the Censor Board is
equipped to respond to 'community standards' when even in a given province they
can arguably vary so widely?
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attending films with an 'adult' context, presumably because, being
at an impressionable age, youth should be protected from
experiences that are beyond their years. (In support of this practice
being intra vires the provinces, and not just another form of
interference in the federal criminal process, I would cite the powers
of the provinces to legislate in relation to minors in other areas such
as consumption of alcoholic beverages.) It would seem, then, on its
face, that classification would fall within this category of legislation
in relation to minors.
Would the effect of these changes be to strip the provinces of any
and all power to supervise who can see a film? If we carry the
example of classification a bit farther, it will be seen that the
Censors (now the 'Film Classification Board') can compel the
advertiser to include various warnings as to the nature of the content
of the film, thus allowing persons who would be upset or offended
(i.e., by coarse language or scenes of violence or sex) to make an
enlightened choice. I believe that it is preferable to allow persons to
make a choice not to patronize a certain film, rather than have a
Censor make that choice for all the persons in the province.
What if the new scenario resulted in many prosecutions under the
Criminal Code in one region of the country? Would that have the
effect of 'legislating' what the rest of the country could see? Given
that the 'local' or 'community' standards approach is open to the
courts, it may be successfully argued that a less liberal community
could secure convictions where they would not occur in another
region. This is admittedly a bizarre situation, for it militates against
the principle of certainty in the criminal law, i.e., that a given act is
or is not prohibited, regardless of the geographical locale (leaving
aside considerations of mens rea for the present).
My answer is that two things could occur. First, because we are
dealing with a criminal test that is inevitably as malleable as the age
in which we live, it is doubtful that a majority of convictions would
hold forth even in a few years. If anything, this fact tends to argue in
favour of the 'community standards' test: it is the standards of the
community that are the most relevant in determinations of this
nature. As a result, a conviction in one jurisdiction may arguably be
open to distinction in another on the basis that the 'community local
standards' test must inevitably vary from place to place. This is
certainly an improvement over the existing system, where the same
version is seen by everyone in the province. 7 5 That cannot be seen
75. And even in other parts of Canada. Most films are imported and shown first in
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as highly flexible or responsive to community standards.
The other thing that could, and likely would, occur is that if a
conviction were registered against a given film, the distributor
would feel compelled to make cuts voluntarily, so as not to risk
prosecution under the same fact situation as the conviction that has
already taken place. And this 'dynamic' give-and-take between the
owner of the film and the public (which would undoubtedly become
active in the debate concerning which films to charge, via the
offices of the attorneys general of the provinces and the courts) is a
positive factor; previously, the distributor took his grievances over
what alterations are made to the censors themselves, and this has
become a closed-door practice, sometimes resulting in pressures
being brought to bear. As in any system of supply and demand, the
distributor and exhibitor would soon learn what is acceptable and
what is not.
In sum, I have argued that there is still some doubt about the
constitutionality of the present system of provincial film censorship.
Notwithstanding that the issue will likely never come before the
Supreme Court again in this form, it is still open to the federal and
provincial authorities to voluntarily revise that system. In light of
the fact that the courts have demonstrated a willingness to respond
to the requirements of the community in which a dispute arises,
coupled with the fact that the present system seems to inhibit, and
not promote, the expression of those requirements I feel that such a
change would go far to encourage freedom and flexibility of choice
for the people of Canada.
Ontario. If cut, the film copies go out to the various provinces still cut. Thus
persons in Alberta or New Brunswick are seeing material deemed acceptable in
Ontario, and they are not realizing any advantage by having a 'local' Board. This
practice is surprisingly common.

